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Bishop further defends this fideistic view in concluding chapters by
arguing that commitment to faith ventures understood in this way is justified as long as one goes beyond, but not contrary to, the evidence. We
are still responsible for looking at whatever evidence is available, and for
holding consistent and coherent beliefs. His view therefore is a robust
fideism that places genuinely objective conditions on morally permissible
faith-ventures; yet this shows only that fideism is undefeated, not that it is
established. Therefore the debate with hard line evidentialist approaches
(which insist that we should withhold assent to religious beliefs) ends in
an impasse, in the sense that neither evidentialism nor fideism is established. Bishop also warns correctly against the temptation to adopt a hard
line evidentialist view because one is antecedently committed to naturalism, in which case one is in the same boat as the fideist. His final word is
that the impasse may have to be solved politically, and vaguely suggests
that some Rawlsian view might be the right way to do this (p. 213). This is
a disappointing conclusion, given that the Rawlsian approach is generally
inhospitable to religion, and that it would require us to decide in advance
of the debate between religion and secularism what can count as properly
belonging in the debate.
The implications of Bishop’s fideistic view are a moral pluralism, thus
a rejection of religious exclusivism; also rejection of any view that holds
that the question of theistic faith beliefs must be settled before we can establish a theory of “correct morality”; it also might entail the rejection of
all classical views of God on the grounds that correct morality could rule
out the traditional God on the basis of the existence of evil. In general, our
(individual?) accounts of “correct morality” will define what can count as
acceptable religious beliefs on this view. Although Bishop’s argument is
sophisticated, complex and carefully developed, it faces some clear difficulties, especially concerning whether one should commit to a belief without adequate evidence, about relativism, and about whether we should
accept the evidential ambiguity of theism in our personal beliefs (as distinct from settling the matter in our own minds, while recognizing that,
as on many subjects, others may come to a different conclusion). Despite
these misgivings, his attempt to defend a modest, but robust, fideism is
one of the most interesting in recent times.

God and Phenomenal Consciousness: A Novel Approach to Knowledge Arguments, by Yujin Nagasawa. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Pp. 162. $85.00 (Cloth).
T. J. MAWSON, University of Oxford
This is a very well-written and clear book, one which brings together ‘knowledge arguments’ from the fields of the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of religion for instructive ‘parallel processing’ and fruitful interplay.
It is divided into four parts. In part one, Nagasawa considers the conceptual background to knowledge arguments: “Knowledge arguments attempt
to transform, via alchemical processes, the base metal of epistemological pre-
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misses into the gold of ontological conclusions. From what one knows and
does not know, they attempt to derive what there is and is not in this world”
(p. 3). Nagel’s ‘What is it like to be a bat?’ Argument and Jackson’s Mary Argument are the two knowledge arguments from the philosophy of mind on
which Nagasawa focuses. The two knowledge arguments from the philosophy of religion which occupy him are Grim’s argument from knowledge de
se against the logical coherence of the classical theistic concept of God and an
argument going in the same direction found in several authors and proceeding from some putative necessary conditions for concept possession.
According to Nagasawa, one important marker to place on the map in
drawing out the similarities of these arguments is what he calls the ‘Physical omniscience thesis,’ that ‘Physical omniscience is omniscience simpliciter’ at least with respect to the universe (p. 8). In essence, if physicalism
about the universe were true, the Physical Omniscience thesis would need
to be true; if everything in the universe were physical, then in knowing
everything about all that is physical, one would ipso facto know everything
about everything in the universe. When we talk of the universe here, we
should note then that we are ignoring abstract objects, God, any angels
or other supernatural beings that there might be, and so on. In this sense
then, physicalism is compatible with theism (Peter van Inwagen is a physicalist) and is, Nagasawa urges, a theory we have good reason to favour.
Nagel’s Bat Argument and Jackson’s Mary Argument can then be seen—
and indeed are, or at least were (Jackson has changed his mind), seen—as
arguments against physicalism, arguments which start from the Physical Omniscience thesis and which, being against physicalism, we have
good reason—Nagasawa urges—to hope are flawed. Nagel’s argument is,
roughly, that given that there is something about what it is like to be a bat
which we cannot know, while there is nothing physical about a bat which
we cannot know, so physical omniscience is not omniscience simpliciter;
and, as we’ve seen, it would be were physicalism true, so physicalism is
false. Jackson’s argument is, roughly, that given that prior to leaving her
black and white room Mary knows everything that there is to know about
the physical properties of colour, but does not know what it is like to see,
for example, a red patch, so physical omniscience is not omniscience simpliciter; and, as we’ve seen, it would be were physicalism true, so physicalism is false. But according to Nagasawa these arguments should not
convince. Our reasonable hope that there is a flaw in them is vindicated.
According to Nagasawa, for physical omniscience it is not enough to
know only those theoretically communicable physical propositions (those
which humans like Nagel can know about bats while yet remaining humans
and which Mary can know about redness prior to leaving her room). In addition, we must also have and use certain “epistemic powers to intuit other
true physical propositions that are not covered by complete theories of the
physical sciences” (p. 13). So, in essence, Nagel, even if he swots up all that
a human can about bats from books, would not be physically omniscient
about bats (because qua human he would not have the epistemic powers of
bats [one presumes]); and Mary is not physically omniscient about redness
prior to leaving her room (she has the epistemic power [one presumes] to
be so, but she has not yet been able to exercise this power). So, just as Nagel
is not able to intuit propositions such as ‘This is what it is like to be a bat,’
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Mary has not yet intuited ‘relevant propositions’ (p. 13) such as ‘This is
what it is like to see red.’ They are not, after all, physically omniscient.
In part two, Nagasawa turns to consider what he argues are parallel
arguments from the philosophy of religion and tells us a bit more about
the crucial notion of epistemic powers. “It is often said that knowledge is
power. If this cliché means that knowledge is equivalent to power, then it
is [wrong]. . . . However, if it means that knowledge is a special form, an
instantiated form, of specific powers, then it [is right]” (p. 23). Grim’s argument that God cannot know what I know when I know that, for example, I am making a mess is undercut—Nagasawa argues—if we suppose
that God may have the epistemic power to know this. But if we decline to
suppose that God may have this power, it should be because we think that
it is strongly impossible that anyone other than I know what I know when
I know that I am making a mess, in which case a demand that God be able
to know this would be a demand that God have a power it is strongly
impossible for Him to have (p. 25), which is—obviously—an unreasonable demand on omnipotence (it is a ‘pseudo task,’ as Nagasawa puts it).
The argument against God’s existence from concept possession on which
Nagasawa focuses is roughly this: to know what, e.g., fear is, one has to
experience it; God by definition needs to know what fear is and God by
definition cannot experience it. So God cannot exist. This argument fares
badly too, according to Nagasawa. It rests on a “version of concept empiricism [which] is subject to . . . counterexamples” (p. 43). For example, Victoria might have experienced fear and thus have the concept and then an
exact duplicate of her, Elizabeth, be made; it does not seem that we should
say that Victoria understands the concept and yet Elizabeth does not, as
they would be neurologically (and in every other respect) identical (p. 60).
Why not then just say that “God could comprehend a proposition that
tells what fear is intuitively . . . God can just intuit what fear is accurately
without possessing or exercising an ability to fear” (p. 71)?
In part three, Nagasawa argues that his analyses of these arguments
from the philosophy of religion are also applicable to the knowledge arguments in the philosophy of mind; the bat argument is structurally parallel
to the argument from knowledge de se, and the Mary argument to the
argument from concept possession (p. 77). “Nagel requires physicalism to
place him in a position to perform a pseudo task, namely, being a bat-type
creature while simultaneously being a non-bat-type creature” (p. 87). This
is because one must either say that a human could in principle know what
it is like to be a bat while staying a human (just as God could in principle
have the epistemic power to know what I know when I know that I am
making a mess), but in fact Nagel would presumably not be willing to
concede this, or then one must say that a human could not do this; he/
she would have to become a batman or maybe even a bat first (whilst also
remaining a human), but then this is obviously strongly impossible. “I
have maintained that there is a fundamental problem with this argument,
which is that he tries to derive an apparent difficulty for physicalism by
appealing to a necessary impossibility” (p. 98).
Finally, in part four, ‘non-theoretical physicalism’ is advanced as the
version of physicalism that is immune to the concerns raised by these
knowledge arguments.
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It “commits to the standard physicalist claim that everything in this
world, including trees, computers, stones, neutrons, and even our conscious experiences, are, in the relevant sense, all physical” (p. 135). It accepts, along with the arguments that Nagasawa has by now shown we
have good reason to reject, the good premise: physical omniscience is omniscience simpliciter. However, it maintains—thus blocking these knowledge arguments against it—that “theoretically communicable physical
omniscience is not physical omniscience” (p. 136). So, “omniscience simpliciter requires an instantiation of extraordinary epistemic powers to intuit relevant propositions” (p. 136). Nagel’s situation (assuming he can’t
turn himself into a bat) and Mary’s situation before she leaves the room
are ones of (potentially [assuming he hasn’t swotted up on an encyclopaedia of bat theory] in the case of Nagel and actually in the case of Mary)
being theoretically physically omniscient, but not omniscient simpliciter.
Non-theoretical physicalism is still a theory—a physicalist theory indeed—then, but it “does not attempt to define physicalism in terms of theoretically communicable propositions” (p. 139). As Nagasawa points out,
“Physicalism in general is committed to the ontological thesis that everything in this world is, in the relevant sense, physical and, consequently,
the physical omniscience thesis that physical omniscience is omniscience
simpliciter. Physicalism is not, however, committed, by itself, even implicitly, to the theoretically communicable omniscience thesis” (p. 141). So
non-theoretical physicalism—which denies the theoretically communicable omniscience thesis—is, by the failures diagnosed in the arguments
looked at in the course of Nagasawa’s book, the sort of physicalism which
should be preferred.
Of course one might tug at some of these strands—definitions of physicalism, epistemic powers, theoretical communicability—and see what unravelled, but all in all God and Phenomenal Consciousness is a closely-argued
work that maps an underexplored area of shared borderland between the
philosophy of mind and the philosophy of religion and, as such, it will be
of interest to philosophers working in either field and of especial interest
to those working in both.

Toward a Theory of Human Rights, by Michael J. Perry. Cambridge University Press, 2007. 253 pages. Cloth $70.00.
ROBERT T. MILLER, Villanova University School of Law
In this short book Michael J. Perry addresses three issues. First, he sets out
what he calls the morality of human rights and argues that, although it
is clear that religious theories can support such a morality, it is far from
clear that non-religious theories can do so. Second, he asks which laws
people who affirm the morality of human rights should press their government to adopt, especially in relation to capital punishment, abortion,
and same-sex unions. Third, he inquires into the proper role of courts in
protecting human rights entrenched in a nation’s constitutional law. This
is a lot to do in 142 pages of text (the rest of the book is endnotes), and I

